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Article 12

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL AND
MEXICAN PERSPECTIVE
MIKE LUBRANO, ESQ.'
The purpose of this discussion is to set out some of the salient characteristics of
Latin America's securities markets, and from this perspective present a case for why
continued viability of these markets is largely dependent on radical changes in the
approach, which, up until now, companies, exchanges, and investors have taken to
corporate governance'. At first, it may not appear to present an encouraging picture.
But it is hoped that by identifying some of the key causes of the markets' current
problems, we can see our way to some solutions.
State of the Markets
It is difficult at this point in time to present an optimistic assessment of Latin
securities markets, particularly the equity markets. During the last semi-annual
meeting of the Council of Securities Regulators of the Americas2 in Caracas, one
presenter stated that all of the traditional exchanges are facing possible extinction.
Most in attendance (including regulators and participants from all of the largest
markets - Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chile) nodded their heads in agreement.
This is not the place to present a detailed analysis of the current woes of the markets.
But to summarize, the obvious symptoms of decline include:
- Reduced domestic trading volumes and a shift to trading in American
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) 3 traded in New York;
- Languishing foreign portfolio inflows;
- Fewer new offerings in domestic markets or via Depositary Receipts

*

Mike Lubrano, Esq. is Senior Securities Markets Specialist in the Financial Market Advisory Department

of International Finance Corporation. Mr. Lubrano has extensive private sector experience with legal and regulatory
issues affecting financial sector development and corporate governance. Currently, he coordinates IFC's work with
the OECD/World Bank's Private Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance. Before going to IFC, he was
an associate with the international law firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, where he represented a number a
Latin American issuers and international investors in securities offerings, structured financing and corporate
reorganizations. He also worked in Mexico City with the Mexican firm of Ritch, Heather y Mueller, S.C. Since
coming to the World Bank Group in 1994, Mr. Lubrano has worked on private sector and securities markets
developments in Latin America, West Bank/Gaza, Russia, Ukraine, Thailand and elsewhere. In addition, he has
advised the Ministry of Finance of Chile and the Brazilian government on securities and corporate governance
issues. He is a former contributing editor of North American Corporate Lawyers and publishes frequently in other
publications. He received an M.P.A. from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and a J.D. from
New York University School of Law. He received his B.A. from Harvard College. The opinions expressed herein

are solely those of the author and should not be amibuted to IFC or the World Bank Group.
I. The term corporate governance can be defined broadly or narrowly. For a broad definition, see Sir
Adrian Cadbury, September 20th 1999. Preface to the World Bank publication, "Corporate Governance: A
Framework for Implementation". Since this discussion is primarily concerned with the relationship between
corporate governance and capital market development, a narrow definition seems appropriate. Here the term refers
to the set of rules, practices, and institutions of internal company governance (e.g. the shareholders meeting, the
Board of Directors) and market discipline of company controllers (disclosure, tender offer rules, etc.) that directly

affect the powers and treatment of outside sources of finance (investors).
2. The Council of Securities Regulators of the Americas (COSRA) is the Western Hemisphere association
of securities commissions and is affiliated with the International Organization of Securities Commissions (tOSCO)
<http://www.iosco.org>.
3. An instrument traded on a U.S. securities exchange or over the counter that is issued by a U.S. bank and
represents a specified number of shares in a foreign corporation. ADRs are bought and sold in the American markets
just like regular shares. An ADR is issued by a U.S. bank and consists of a bundle of shares of a foreign corporation
that are being held in custody overseas.
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Exit from the domestic capital markets of Latin American blue chips, often
as a consequence of absorption by an overseas parent;
De-listings and going private transactions; and
Stagnating or declining market capitalization.

In Brazil, the region's largest economy with the largest market capitalization,
ADR trading of domestic companies began to exceed trading on the Slo Paulo Stock
Exchange in March and April of 20004. In 1999, the number of listed companies
contracted, with the de-listing of companies on both ends of the spectrum - family-

controlled companies on the one hand, and large subsidiaries of multinational
companies (particularly in telecommunications and electricity) on the other.
The Argentine public equities market has all but disappeared - its market
capitalization at the end of 1999 was only 8% of GDP5 . Trading volume is also
down, to about US$20-30 million from US$50 million a few years ago. This too is

partly the result of de-listing, most notably the take-over of YPF, formerly the most
traded Argentine stock, by Spain's Repso16 .
Chile, despite its large domestic savings, has also witnessed an equity supply
problem. De-listings have occurred not only in utilities, but also in financial
services as well. Controlling shareholders are taking larger shares of companies,
reducing the public float - the case of Endesa-Espafia's purchase of a controlling
position in Enersis' is the most dramatic case.
While de-listings and market capitalization contraction has been less pronounced
so far in Mexico, that country is not likely to be immune from these trends. Most
trading in Mexican equities has long taken place in New York in the form of ADRs.
Mexican market participants are aware of the dynamic that has been evident in
Brazil, Argentina and Chile - and they see the signs in their own market of fewer
listings, few new offerings and declining investor interest. The Mexican smallcapital market experiment, the MEMMEX, failed to flourish. Further consolidation
of the financial sector, bankruptcies, and the consolidation of Mexican industry are
likely to result in further shrinkage of the supply of domestic equity securities.
Some Reasons Behind the Stagnation and Contraction
At first, the rapid contraction and resulting stagnation in the markets is surprising,
given other developments in the Latin economies. True, these past five years have
been bumpy - with the Tequila, Asian and Brazilian crises all taking their toll.
However, this period has been impressive in terms of foreign capital flows in the
form of direct investment. 1999 was a record year for foreign direct investment in

4. Lucia Rebouqas, Negdcio corn ADR brasileiro jd supera Bovespa, GAZETA MERCANT'L (Slo Paulo),

May 4, 2000, at B-1.
5.

Death of the Stock Market, EuROMONEY, March 2000, at 64.

6. Repsol YPF is an oil, chemical and gas company, carrying out activities in exploration and production,
refining, distribution and marketing, chemicals and natural gas and electricity. In 1999, Repsol, Spain's largest
petroleum company conducted successful tender offer for YPF, Argentina's dominant petroleum company, and
converted it into a subsidiary.
7. Endesa-Espaila is Spain's largest electric utility, producing about half of all electric power in Spain. In
1999-2000, it amassed a controlling interest in Enersis, Chile's 's largest electric utility.
8. The Mexican Mid-cap Market (MEMMEX) was launched by the Mexican Stock Exchange in 1997, but
was closed by 1999.
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Brazil (where it reached US$ 31 billion)9 , as well as for Argentina, Mexico, Chile
and Peru. And in countries like Argentina, Mexico and Peru, the mandatory private
pension system is beginning to kick in - which might be expected to provide the
demand needed to increase domestic equity and debt market activity. But instead
the securities markets have languished.
The reasons for the failure of domestic securities markets to grow have both an
encouraging and a discouraging side to them. On the positive side, many of Latin
America's best companies have become attractive purchases for multinational
companies looking to expand. The take-overs of YPF by Repsol in Argentina and
of Enersis by Endesa-Espafia are just two high-profile cases. The region's best
companies are also finding cheaper costs of capital by financing through
international markets, either via direct debt offers or through parent companies
based abroad then downstream the funding to the subsidiary. Also, global economic
consolidation and integration (including NAFTA 0 and MERCOSUR") means that
it is reasonable to expect fewer and fewer of the region's large companies to remain
independent and domestically focused.
Sadly, however, it is not just their growing access to foreign capital and foreign
markets, and their attractiveness to foreign purchasers, that has caused many Latin
companies to withdraw from domestic markets. Crowding out by high domestic
interest rates remains a major problem for Brazil, and to a lesser extent for the other
major markets. High domestic interests rates, reflecting the government's need to
finance fiscal deficits, but also incorporating investor perception of macroeconomic
and policy risk, dampens both the supply and demand side of the securities markets.
Despite this, what we have seen in the past couple of years in Brazil and elsewhere
is that as domestic interest rates come down, there has been little corresponding
increase in equity market activity. Why?
A key factor is that investors, both domestic and foreign, have become
discouraged by poor corporate governance practices, mistreatment of minority
shareholders and weak investor protection under the local legal/regulatory regimes.
A number of well-publicized cases of disadvantageous treatment of minority
shareholders in take-overs and de-listings served to underline, for the investor
community the risks of investing in Latin companies, even when such companies
are competitive and growing. The potential for shareholder abuse, both in the case
of one-time events like take-overs, and through less than arms-length transactions
with controlling shareholders (e.g., the case of Mexico's TV Azteca12) has resulted

9. Matt Moffett, Cash Flows intoLtinAmerica, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE, February 2,2000,

at 62.
10. NAFTA -North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug.12, 1992, revised Sept.6, 1992, U.S.Can.-Mex.. 32 LLM. 605 (entered into force Jan.l, 1994).
11. The Common Market of the Southern Cone is a customs union established by the Treaty of Asuncion,
March 26, 1991. It comprises four members (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) and two Associate
Members (Bolivia and Chile) representing over 220 million people. MERCOSUR is the third-largest trading bloc
in the world after the EU and NAFTA. 30 L.LM. 1041 (1991), See also
< http'J/www.mac.doc.gov/ola/mercosur/mgiiinbrief.hta,>.
12. TV AZTECA S.A. de C.V. is the second largest producer of Spanish programming in the world, and one
of two broadcast television companies in Mexico, operating two national television networks, through more than
250 owned-and-operated stations located throughout Mexico. In 2000, the company, under the control of Mr.

Ricardo Salinas Pliego, provided an important part of the financing of a cellular telephone franchise also controlled
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in huge premiums being offered for controlling blocks of shares. This sends a signal
to portfolio investors that if you don't have control, you won't get a fair deal.
Minority investors may not see dividends reflecting the real profitability of the firm
while they hold the shares, and they won't participate in the upside when the
controllers sell out. This is not a recipe for confidence.
The problem for domestic market development is compounded when one
considers that as the number of listings declines, the native infrastructure of market
analysts and securities dealers also begins to disappear, making it progressively
more difficult for new issuers to get access through these channels. The fewer blue
chips there are, the fewer analysts there are likely to be to look at new companies.
Central Role of CorporateGovernance
In some sense, a good part of the old approach to promoting securities markets
development in Latin America (as well as elsewhere in the emerging markets) could
be described as "If you build it, they will come." That is, if a country's public
authorities and private sector establish the legal framework for issuing, selling and
trading securities; and modem trading systems, secure clearance and settlement are
in place, and as long as there is a relatively stable macroeconomy, the market will
grow and thrive. Issuers will be willing and able to issue, investors will buy, and
brokers will trade.
All this was true for a time in Mexico and the rest of the region. Why? Because
of pent-up supply and demand. The core issuers - the region's blue chips, and its
newly privatized utilities - were ready to float a portion (though rarely if ever a
potentially controlling portion) of their shares. And there were domestic and foreign
investors that either wanted to, or had to, take positions in the local economy.
Country funds, including some in which IFC"3 helped to sponsor, provided
international investors with a way to take diversified country exposure. There was
substantial appetite for this, as international investors saw investment in a diversified
portfolio of major blue chips as a way of capitalizing on the expected growth
potential of Mexico and the rest of the region in the aftermath of the 1980s debt
crisis.
Of course, not all investors were completely blind to the shortcomings of
transparency and governance of Latin America's largely family-owned public
companies in the early 1990s when the markets were taking off. They understood
that buying a small percentage of the stock of a Mexican company was not the same
as buying a similar position in an U.S. or UK blue chip. Local accounting standards
differed from those prevailing in OECD countries. The role and responsibility of
boards of directors were less defined, and the remedies against self-serving
managers (who were usually also the controlling shareholders) were much weaker.
by Mr. Salinas Pliego. See also Andrea Mandel-Campbel, Mexican Entrepreneur inPeace Offering to Minorities,

FINANCIAL TIMES, October 12, 1999, at 38.
13. The International Finance Corporation, part of the World Bank Group, promotes private sector

investment in developing countries, which will reduce poverty and improve people's lives. IFC is the largest
multilateral source of loan and equity financing for private sector projects in the developing world. IFC finances
and provides advice for private sector ventures and projects in developing countries in partnership with private
investors and, through its advisory work, helps governments create conditions that stimulate the flow of both

domestic

and

foreign

private

savings

<http:f/www.ifc.orglabout/facts/mission/mission.html>.

and

investment.

IFC

Mission

Statement.
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But most investors, even the most savvy, were complacent, and felt they could
afford to be. They knew that disclosure, professional oversight, and legal
enforcement were not up to ideal standards, but they also knew, or thought they
knew, that there were natural limits to how badly minority shareholders could be
treated by the big companies. The nature of the business of most Latin issuers predominantly utilities and established industries - imposed practical limits on the
opportunities for management misrepresentation and tunneling of profits. In
addition, there was market discipline over companies that wanted to raise more
money in the securities markets in future years.
What investigators learned is that the practical limits on shareholder mistreatment
were weaker than they thought, and likely to become weaker still. One reason is
that today's companies are harder to understand. The businesses of the companies
that are likely to want to come to domestic capital markets is dramatically distinct
from the old blue chips that went public in the 1980s and 1990s. In the late 1980s,
investors could buy stock of an electricity generating company and predict that if
GDP grew at a 5% annual rate, electricity consumption would grow and revenues
would rise. The company's plants would be renovated through introduction of know
technologies and become more efficient, allowing the company's assets and
earnings to increase commensurately. (This author recalls his days representing a
Mexican brewer. The prospectuses were all about the relationship between beer
consumption, demographics and GDP.) However, when investors look at Latin
America's rising companies today, with new technologies and in less-established
industries - the kind of dynamic enterprises that Mexico needs to develop and
modernize - they can't rely on valuation principles such as beer consumption to
GDP. Each new company is more than ever a unique mix of skills, technologies and
potential markets. Investors, or at least the private securities markets infrastructure
of analysts, financial journalists, and asset managers, need to understand in greater
detail each company's financial workings and business strategy in order to assess
its prospects. They need to understand its management and how flexible it is.
Finally, they need to have confidence that they understand the company's numbers,
its strategy, and especially its internal checks and balances and oversight of
management. And of course, they need to have confidence in the legal regulatory
framework that assures that the company will respect the equity contract embedding
in its shares.
Conclusion
It is fair then to ask, what can those of us (like IFC) with an interest in seeing
deeper and broader capital markets in Mexico and the rest of the region look forward
to? What is the task ahead? There are at least two central themes that we need to
build on. First, Latin America's securities market needs to be re-invented. They are
not at a normal stage in a gradual evolution. The traditional exchanges and the
infrastructure that supports them are at a point where they become a new species, or
else go the way of the dinosaur. Second, the new market or markets that emerge can
only be built on the basis of clear property rights in sound, transparent public
companies. This means, first and foremost, good corporate governance and the
equitable treatment of shareholders and other outside sources of capital.
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What solutions should those, like IFC, who see securities markets as an important
part of a healthy financial sector, and as an essential element of private sector-led
growth, be promoting? It's probably too early to tell in exquisite detail, but some
guiding principles can help us get moving in the right direction:
-

-

-

-

First, policy makers must keep their eyes on the prize. Their goal is to build
an infrastructure that maximizes access to affordable capital by good
companies. The goal is not to save the local stock exchanges. It is tempting
to be sentimental about institutions that have survived since the 19th century.
But they survived because they served the needs of the day, and if they can't
or won't adapt to the new reality, they belong in a museum.
Second, the public and private sector should focus on the binding constraints.
Particularly in Mexico, the binding constraints today are not in the costs or
risks of the trading systems. They are the corporate governance practices of
the issuers, and the infrastructure that is needed to assure the quality of
information, dissemination, analysis of information on companies, and
enforcement of claims. If the rights represented by the securities traded in the
market remain ill defined and difficult to enforce, the best trading systems in
the world can't make them a good investment.
Third, every country is different, with indigenous business customs and
practices. But capital markets will become even more international. This
means, like it or not, that compliance with international standards - be they
in accounting and audit, internal controls or corporate governance - must be
the objective of policy makers, market participants and companies. And if
one looks at the standards that we are talking about today, like IAS
(international accounting standards), IOSCO's disclosure standards for crossborder securities offerings", or the OECD's Principles of Corporate
Governance'-, it is evident that each country can internalize them without
abandoning the useful elements of its indigenous business culture. The fact
that the new Mexican Code of Best Corporate Practices 6 is fully consistent
with the OECD Principles is ample evidence of this.
Finally, we must all be practical and realistic, not doctrinaire and theoretical
in approach. This means building markets and infrastructure that suit the
kinds of issuers and investors we have today and can reasonably expect in the
near- to mid-term. It is nice to think twenty or thirty years down the road, but

14. International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is designed to promote high standards
of regulation in order to maintain just, efficient and sound markets; to exchange information on their respective
experiences in order to promote the development of domestic markets; to unite their efforts to establish standards
and an effective surveillance of international securities transactions; and to provide mutual assistance to promote
the integrity of the markets by a rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement against offenses.
<http'J/www.iosco.org>.
15. The Principles are intended to assist member and non-member governments in their efforts to evaluate
and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in their countries, and to
provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations, and other parties that have a role
in the process of developing good corporate governance. Tbe Principles focus on publicly traded companies.
However, to the extent they are deemed applicable, they might also be a useful tool to improve corporate
governance in non-traded companies, for example, privately held and state-owned enterprises. The Principles
represent a common basis that OECD Member countries consider essential for the development of good governance
practice. They are intended to be concise, understandable and accessible to the international community. They are
not intended to substitute for private sector initiatives to develop more detailed "best practice" in governance. The
Principles are available through the website of the Global Corporate Governance Forum <http'J/www.gcgf.org>.
16. The Mexican Code of Best Corporate Practices was published by the Business Coordinating Council
(Consejo Coordinador Empresorial) in 2000. <http://www.cce.org>.
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in this age of rapid globalization and technological advance, building for the
future may best be accomplished by securing the short term and remaining
flexible.
What are, or will be, some of the signs that the importance of improving governance
has been internalized? Here, recent developments do give some reason for
optimism. Encouraging signs that companies, market participants, the public, and
governments are moving in the right direction include:
-

-

-

-

-

-

Public awareness / Change in corporate culture. One good thing about
scandals is they shake people out of complacency. The wave of corporate
governance-related scandals in the region since 1997 has moved corporate
governance up the agenda, and placed it on the business pages and sometimes
on the front pages of the national and international papers. Some offending
companies have responded, by adopting codes of best practice, improving
their practices, and publicizing their willingness to change.
Recognition that new companies need better, not worse transparencyand
governance. This is the idea behind Brazil's Novo Mercado". Issuers listing
on the Novo Mercado must meet one of two enhanced disclosure standards
and internal governance standards. Under the stricter standards, a listed
company must agree to submit to arbitration of disputes with shareholders.
Improvement of standards,coordinationof effots. By the end of next year
all of the major markets of the region, and some of the smaller, will likely
have voluntary national codes of corporate governance in place. Mexico
already does. Through the Council of Securities Regulators of the Americas
and the OECD/World Bank Latin America Corporate Governance
Roundtable' g, both the public and private sectors are working together both
within and without the region to coordinate their reform efforts and agree on
regional priorities. These efforts will need to intensify as the markets
transform and become more integrated.
Deepening of private informational infrastructure. Here there are some
encouraging efforts, on the part of local as well as international information
service providers (like Standard & Poor's) to develop rating like products that
assess and report the quality of internal governance and transparency of
issuers.
Legal Reforms. First Chile, and now Brazil and Argentina have undertaken
long-overdue reforms of their company and securities legislation to reinforce
shareholder rights, better define the role of directors, and require greater
transparency and comparability of financial and other company information.
Mexico must not be far behind.
Enforcement. While enforcement remains a weak link, the high profile that
securities regulators have taken in recent cases of shareholder abuse bodes
well. But their resources are modest. It is to be hoped that the role that the
securities regulators have played in mitigating some of the worst abuses will
encourage legislatures to increase their legal authority and resources. The

17. In late 2000, the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange established new listing segments for companies with better
corporate governance practices. Companies that meet the highest standards may be listed on the "Novo Mercado."
Geoff Dyer, Brazil's Pitchfor Market Credibility,FiNANCIAl TIMES, February 27, 2001, at 12.
18. The Latin American Roundtable aims to facilitate public and private sector policy-dialogue. It provides
a forum for the exchange of experiences between senior policy-makers, regulators and market participants with first
hand experience of present developments and ongoing work. <http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairslgovernance/roundtables/' -latin-americat>.
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Novo Mercado's experiment with arbitration is also a good sign. But, of

course, these can never be complete substitutes for competent courts to which
shareholders can have recourse when all else fails.
So we can end on an encouraging note, in the realization that all these efforts need
additional support, from both the public and private sectors. As it was and continues
to be in the OECD countries, improving corporate governance in Latin America will
require determination on the part of companies, investors, market participants,
professionals and government. Without these efforts, the securities markets cannot
hope to prosper.

